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Abstract
It is standard practice in applied work to rely on linear least squares regres-
sion to estimate the effect of a binary variable (“treatment”) on some outcome
of interest. In this paper I study the interpretation of the regression estimand
when treatment effects are in fact heterogeneous. I show that the coefficient
on treatment is identical to the outcome of the following three-step proce-
dure: first, calculate the linear projection of treatment on the vector of other
covariates (“propensity score”); second, calculate average partial effects for
both groups of interest from a regression of outcome on treatment, the propen-
sity score, and their interaction; third, calculate a weighted average of these
two effects, with weights being inversely related to the unconditional proba-
bility that a unit belongs to a given group. Each of these steps is potentially
problematic, but this last property—the reliance on implicit weights which
are inversely related to the proportion of each group—can have particularly
devastating consequences for applied work. To illustrate the severity of this
issue, I perform Monte Carlo simulations as well as replicate two prominent
applied papers: Berger, Easterly, Nunn and Satyanath (2013) on the effects of
successful CIA interventions during the Cold War on imports from the US;
and Martinez-Bravo (2014) on the effects of appointed officials on village-level
electoral results in Indonesia. In both cases some of the conclusions change
dramatically after allowing for heterogeneity in effects.
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1 Introduction
Many applied researchers study the effect of a binary variable (“treatment”) on the ex-
pected value of some outcome of interest, holding fixed a vector of other covariates. As
noted by Imbens (2014), despite the availability of a large number of semi- and nonpara-
metric estimators for average treatment effects, applied researchers typically continue to
use conventional regression methods. In particular, it is standard practice in applied work
to use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate
yi = α+ τdi + Xiβ+ εi, (1)
where y denotes the outcome, d denotes the binary variable of interest, and X denotes
the row vector of other covariates (control variables); τˆ is then usually interpreted as the
average treatment effect (ATE). This simple estimation strategy is used in recent papers
by Fryer and Levitt (2004), Gittleman and Wolff (2004), Almond, Chay and Lee (2005), El-
der, Goddeeris and Haider (2010), Fryer and Greenstone (2010), Fryer and Levitt (2010),
Lang and Manove (2011), Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013), Berger, Easterly, Nunn
and Satyanath (2013), Bond and Lang (2013), Boustan and Collins (2013), Rothstein and
Wozny (2013), Vogl (2013), Martinez-Bravo (2014), and many others.
The great appeal of linear least squares regression comes from its simplicity. At the
same time, however, a large body of evidence demonstrates the empirical importance of
heterogeneity in effects (see, e.g., Heckman, 2001; Bitler, Gelbach and Hoynes, 2006, 2008)
which is explicitly ruled out by the model in (1). In this paper, therefore, I study the inter-
pretation of the least squares estimand in the homogeneous linear model when treatment
effects are in fact heterogeneous. I derive a new theoretical result which demonstrates that
τˆ is identical to the outcome of the following three-step procedure: in the first step, calcu-
late the linear projection of d on X, i.e. the “propensity score” from the linear probability
model; in the second step, regress y on d, the propensity score, and their interaction—and
calculate average partial effects from this model for both groups of interest (“treated”
and “controls”); in the third step, calculate a weighted average of these two effects—with
weights being inversely related to the unconditional probability that a unit belongs to a
given group. In consequence, when the proportion of one group increases, the weight on
the effect on this group decreases. The limit of the regression estimand, as the proportion
of treated units approaches unity, is the average treatment effect on the controls. I also
establish conditions under which linear regression recovers
τ = P (d = 1) · τATC + P (d = 0) · τATT (2)
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instead of
τATE = P (d = 1) · τATT + P (d = 0) · τATC, (3)
where τATE denotes the average treatment effect, τATT denotes the average treatment ef-
fect on the treated, and τATC denotes the average treatment effect on the controls; also,
P (d = 1) and P (d = 0) denote population proportions of treated and control units, re-
spectively. As a consequence of the disparity between (2) and (3), in many empirical
applications the linear regression estimates might not be close to any of the average treat-
ment effects of interest.
What follows, this paper contributes to a growing field of research in econometrics
which studies the interpretation of various estimation methods when their underlying as-
sumption of effect homogeneity is violated. See, for example, Wooldridge (2005), Løken,
Mogstad and Wiswall (2012), Chernozhukov, Ferna´ndez-Val, Hahn and Newey (2013),
Imai and Kim (2013), and Gibbons, Sua´rez Serrato and Urbancic (2014) for studies of
fixed effects (FE) methods as well as Imbens and Angrist (1994), Angrist, Graddy and
Imbens (2000), Løken et al. (2012), Kolesa´r (2013), and Dieterle and Snell (2014) for stud-
ies of instrumental variables (IV) estimators.1 Also, the interpretation of the coefficient
on a binary variable in linear least squares regression is studied by Angrist (1998) and
Humphreys (2009), and both of these papers consider a saturated model for covariates,
i.e. the estimating equation includes a separate binary variable for each combination of co-
variate values (“stratum”).2 In such a restricted setting, Angrist (1998) demonstrates that
the weights underlying linear regression are proportional to the variance of treatment in
each stratum.3 Humphreys (2009) extends this result and shows that the linear regression
estimand is bounded by both group-specific average treatment effects whenever treat-
ment assignment probabilities are monotonic in stratum-specific effects. While both of
these papers make substantive contributions, they might not always provide an accurate
interpretation for linear regression estimates in applied studies, because saturated models
are rarely used in practice.4 In this paper, therefore, I complement these previous results
by relaxing the saturated model restriction and still deriving a closed-form expression for
1This literature is also related to Heckman and Vytlacil (2005), Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006),
and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) who provide an interpretation of various estimators, conditional on X, as
weighted averages of marginal treatment effects.
2Also, the interpretation of the coefficient on a continuous variable in linear regression is studied by
Yitzhaki (1996), Deaton (1997), Angrist and Krueger (1999), Løken et al. (2012), and Solon, Haider and
Wooldridge (2013).
3A similar result for nonsaturated models is derived by Rhodes (2010) and Aronow and Samii (2014).
In both of these papers the regression estimand is interpreted as a weighted average of individual-level
treatment effects—which is quite different from this paper.
4For notable exceptions, see Angrist (1998), Black, Smith, Berger and Noel (2003), and Angrist and
Pischke (2009).
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the regression estimand—in terms of group-specific average treatment effects (τATT and
τATC). This formulation is very attractive because each regression estimate can now be ex-
pressed as a weighted average of two estimates of τATT and τATC. Moreover, the weights
are also easily computed—and they are always nonnegative and sum to one.
To illustrate the importance of this result, I perform Monte Carlo simulations and repli-
cate two influential applied papers: Berger et al. (2013) and Martinez-Bravo (2014). Both
of these papers study the effect of a binary variable (US interventions in foreign countries
and whether the local officials are appointed or elected, respectively) on the expected
value of some outcome of interest, and both rely on a model with homogeneous effects
which is estimated using OLS. Berger et al. (2013) conclude that CIA interventions dur-
ing the Cold War led to a dramatic increase in imports from the US, without affecting
exports to the US, aggregate imports, and aggregate exports. However, when I present
the implied estimates of the average effect of CIA interventions on intervened countries
and nonintervened countries, it becomes clear that this conclusion is driven by the large
discrepancy in the effect on nonintervened countries across specifications—while this pa-
rameter is arguably of little interest in this application.5 The implied estimates of the
average effect on intervened countries are all significantly positive and remarkably stable
across specifications—and suggest that CIA interventions led to an (unbelievably large)
increase in all measures of international trade in intervened countries. Surprisingly, when
I relax the linear relationship between potential outcomes and the propensity score, and
use a matching estimator, these effects often become significantly negative.
My second empirical application concentrates on the effects of appointed village heads
on electoral results. In a recent paper, Martinez-Bravo (2014) studies the outcome of the
first democratic election in Indonesia after the fall of the regime of General Soeharto. She
concludes that Golkar, i.e. Soeharto’s party, was more likely to win in kelurahan villages
which had appointed village heads, compared with desa villages which had elected vil-
lage heads. In this paper, however, I document that linear regression provides a very
poor approximation to the average effect of appointed officials. Note that kelurahan vil-
lages constitute a small fraction of this data set, while my theoretical result suggests that
linear regression will therefore attach nearly all of the weight to the average effect of ap-
pointed officials in these villages, and not in desa. This is reconfirmed in my analysis, and
I conclude that the average treatment effect, i.e. the average difference in electoral results
between similar kelurahan and desa villages, is not significantly different from zero.
5Imagine, for example, estimating the effect of CIA interventions in Australia, Canada, and the UK
on their imports from the US. Note that the measure of CIA interventions equals one “if the CIA either
installed a foreign leader or provided covert support for the regime once in power” (Berger et al., 2013).
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2 Theoretical Results
As before, let y denote the outcome, let d denote the binary variable of interest (“treat-
ment”), and let X denote the row vector of other covariates. If L (· | ·) denotes the linear
projection, this paper is concerned with the interpretation of τ in
L (y | 1, d, X) = α+ τd + Xβ, (4)
when the population linear model is possibly incorrect. Before giving my main theoretical
results, however, I introduce further definitions. In particular, let
ρ = P (d = 1) (5)
denote the unconditional probability of “treatment” and let
p (X) = L (d | 1, X) = αs + Xβs (6)
denote the “propensity score” from the linear probability model.6 Note that p (X) is the
best linear approximation to the true propensity score. It is also helpful to introduce two
linear projections of y on 1 and p (X), separately for d = 1 and d = 0, namely
L [y | 1, p (X)] = α1 + γ1 · p (X) if d = 1 (7)
and also
L [y | 1, p (X)] = α0 + γ0 · p (X) if d = 0. (8)
Note that Equations 6–8 are definitional. I do not assume that these linear projections
correspond to well-specified population models and I do not put any restrictions on the
underlying data-generating process. Similarly, I define the average partial effect of d as
τAPE = (α1 − α0) + (γ1 − γ0) · E [p (X)] (9)
as well as the average partial effect of d on group j (j = 0, 1) as
τAPE|d=j = (α1 − α0) + (γ1 − γ0) · E [p (X) | d = j] . (10)
6Note that this “propensity score” does not need to have any behavioral interpretation. For example,
d can be an attribute, in the sense of Holland (1986), and therefore does not need to constitute a feasible
“treatment” in any “ideal experiment” (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Although it might be difficult, for
example, to conceptualize the “propensity score” for gender or race, it does not matter for this definition.
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If d is unconfounded conditional on X, then the propensity score theorem (Rosenbaum
and Rubin, 1983) implies that τAPE, τAPE|d=1, and τAPE|d=0 have a useful interpretation as
the average treatment effect, the average treatment effect on the treated, and the average
treatment effect on the controls, respectively. It should be stressed, however, that the main
result of this paper (Theorem 1) is more general and does not require unconfoundedness.
Theorem 1 (Decomposition of the Linear Regression Estimand) Define τ as in (4) and de-
fine τAPE|d=1 and τAPE|d=0 as in (10). Let V (· | ·) denote the conditional variance. Then,
τ =
ρ ·V [p (X) | d = 1]
ρ ·V [p (X) | d = 1] + (1− ρ) ·V [p (X) | d = 0] · τAPE|d=0
+
(1− ρ) ·V [p (X) | d = 0]
ρ ·V [p (X) | d = 1] + (1− ρ) ·V [p (X) | d = 0] · τAPE|d=1.
Theorem 1 shows that τ, the linear regression estimand, can be expressed as a weighted
average of τAPE|d=1 and τAPE|d=0, with nonnegative weights which always sum to one.7
The definition of τAPE|d=j makes it clear that the regression estimand is always identical to
the outcome of a particular three-step procedure. In the first step, we obtain p (X), i.e. the
“propensity score”. In applied work, however, it is quite rare to estimate propensity
scores using the linear probability model, probably because the estimated probabilities
are not ensured to be strictly between zero and one—and therefore it is important to note
that linear regression is implicitly based on this procedure. Next, in the second step,
we obtain τAPE|d=1 and τAPE|d=0 from a regression of y on d, p (X), and their interaction.
Again, similar procedures are rarely used in practice and are generally not recommended,
because it is difficult to motivate a linear relationship between potential outcomes and
the propensity score (see, e.g., Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). According to Theorem 1,
however, linear regression is implicitly based on this restrictive model. Finally, in the
third step, we calculate a weighted average of τAPE|d=1 and τAPE|d=0. The weight which
is placed by linear regression on τAPE|d=1 is increasing in V [p (X) | d = 0] and 1− ρ and
the weight which is placed on τAPE|d=0 is increasing in V [p (X) | d = 1] and ρ.
At first, this weighting scheme might be seen as surprising: the more units belong
to group j (d = j, j = 0, 1), the less weight is placed on τAPE|d=j, i.e. the effect on this
group. To aid intuition, recall that the linear regression model is based on the assumption
of homogeneity in effects; in particular, τAPE = τAPE|d=1 = τAPE|d=0. Notice also that
τAPE|d=1 (τAPE|d=0) is estimated, in general, using the data from units with d = 0 (d = 1).
7See Appendix A for the proof of Theorem 1.
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Therefore, if effects are assumed to be homogeneous, we want to place more (less) weight
on τˆAPE|d=1 when the proportion of units with d = 1 decreases (increases), as this will
improve efficiency in estimating τAPE. However, the opposite holds true if effects are
allowed to be heterogeneous, and then using linear regression is likely to introduce bias.
There are several interesting corollaries of Theorem 1. Similar to the discussion above,
Corollary 1 clarifies the causal interpretability of the linear regression estimand.
Corollary 1 (Causal Interpretation of the Linear Regression Estimand) Suppose that d is
unconfounded conditional on X and that the population models for d and y are linear in X and
p (X), respectively. Then, Theorem 1 implies that
τ =
ρ ·V [p (X) | d = 1]
ρ ·V [p (X) | d = 1] + (1− ρ) ·V [p (X) | d = 0] · τATC
+
(1− ρ) ·V [p (X) | d = 0]
ρ ·V [p (X) | d = 1] + (1− ρ) ·V [p (X) | d = 0] · τATT.
In other words, if one assumes that unconfoundedness holds and that the population
models for d and y are correctly specified as linear in X and p (X), respectively, the
weighting scheme from Theorem 1 will apply to τATT and τATC. In particular, the weight
which is placed on τATT is increasing in 1− ρ and the weight which is placed on τATC is
increasing in ρ. Corollary 2 shows that the relationship between τ and ρ is in fact mono-
tonic. The only case where τ is unrelated to ρ occurs when both group-specific average
partial effects are equal.
Corollary 2 Theorem 1 implies that
dτ
dρ
=
V [p (X) | d = 1] ·V [p (X) | d = 0] ·
[
τAPE|d=0 − τAPE|d=1
]
[ρ ·V [p (X) | d = 1] + (1− ρ) ·V [p (X) | d = 0]]2
.
Therefore, if τAPE|d=1 > τAPE|d=0, then dτdρ < 0. With an increase in ρ, τ deviates from
τAPE|d=1 towards τAPE|d=0. Similarly, if τAPE|d=1 < τAPE|d=0, then dτdρ > 0. Again, with an
increase in ρ, τ deviates from τAPE|d=1 towards τAPE|d=0. In other words, when τAPE|d=1 6=
τAPE|d=0 and the proportion of one group changes, the weight on the effect on this group
always changes in the opposite direction.
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Corollary 3 Theorem 1 implies that
lim
ρ→1
τ = τAPE|d=0 and lim
ρ→0
τ = τAPE|d=1.
According to Corollary 3, another consequence of Theorem 1 is that the linear regression
estimand approaches the average partial effect on group j whenever—in the limit—the
proportion of units with d = j goes to zero. Under a causal interpretation, when nearly
everyone is treated, we get very close to the average treatment effect on the controls;
conversely, when nearly nobody gets treated, we approach the average treatment effect
on this (nearly nonexistent) group. Therefore, Corollary 3 provides the foundation for a
simple rule of thumb: if nearly everyone belongs to group j, linear regression will ap-
proximately provide an estimate of the effect on the other group. As noted previously, this
is a reasonable property under the assumption of homogeneity in effects: if nearly every-
one belongs to group j, then we can estimate the effect on the other group, and not on
group j, with relative precision. This argument arises from the fact that we use the data
from units with d = 0 (d = 1) to estimate the counterfactual for units with d = 1 (d = 0);
therefore, the precision of the estimates for group j is increasing in the amount of data
from the other group. If we maintain the assumption of homogeneity in effects, then we
should indeed place little weight on the effect for the large group. This logic, however, is
no longer applicable when effects are allowed to be heterogeneous.
Another consequence of Theorem 1 is described by Corollary 4. We can start with
noting that the average partial effect of d can be written as
τAPE = ρ · τAPE|d=1 + (1− ρ) · τAPE|d=0. (11)
Then, Corollary 4 provides a condition under which linear regression reverses these “nat-
ural” weights on τAPE|d=1 and τAPE|d=0.
Corollary 4 Suppose that V [p (X) | d = 1] = V [p (X) | d = 0]. Then, Theorem 1 implies that
τ = ρ · τAPE|d=0 + (1− ρ) · τAPE|d=1.
Precisely, if the variance of the “propensity score” is equal in both groups of interest, then
the linear regression estimand is equal to a weighted average of both group-specific aver-
age partial effects, with reversed weights attached to these effects. Namely, the proportion
of units with d = 1 is used to weight the average partial effect of d on group zero and the
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proportion of units with d = 0 is used to weight the average partial effect of d on group
one. Therefore, there is only one situation in which Corollary 4 allows the linear regres-
sion estimand to be equal to the average partial effect of d, and this occurs whenever not
only V [p (X) | d = 1] = V [p (X) | d = 0] but also ρ = 1− ρ = 12 . Moreover, Corollary 5
provides a more general condition under which we can recover the average partial effect
of d using linear regression.
Corollary 5 Suppose that τAPE|d=1 6= τAPE|d=0. Then, Theorem 1 implies that
τ = τAPE if and only if
V [p (X) | d = 1]
V [p (X) | d = 0] =
(
1− ρ
ρ
)2
.
Of course, this condition is very demanding, and we cannot, in general, expect it to hold.
Corollary 5 can therefore be seen as an alternative example of the “knife-edge special
case” of consistency of OLS, similar to Solon et al. (2013).
So how can we solve the problem described in Theorem 1? Actually, there are many
well-known estimation methods which do not pose similar problems. First, it is suffi-
cient to interact the binary variable of interest with other covariates, and then calculate
the average partial effect of d on a particular group (similar to Equations 9 and 10). This
leads to an estimator which is sometimes referred to as “Oaxaca–Blinder” (Kline, 2011,
2014), “regression adjustment” (Wooldridge, 2010), “flexible OLS” (Khwaja, Picone, Salm
and Trogdon, 2011), or even simply “regression” (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Sec-
ond, one can use any of the standard semi- and nonparametric estimators for average
treatment effects, such as inverse probability weighting, matching, and other methods
based on the propensity score (for a review, see Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Third,
it might also help to estimate a model with homogeneous effects using weighted least
squares (WLS). In particular, we might use the method of Lin (2013), in which Equation 1
is estimated using WLS, with weights of 1−ρρ for units with d = 1 and weights of
ρ
1−ρ
for units with d = 0. However, note that—unlike in Lin (2013) who studies regression
adjustments to experimental data—this estimator is consistent for the average partial ef-
fect of d only in a special case, namely under the restrictive condition in Corollary 4,
V [p (X) | d = 1] = V [p (X) | d = 0], which is trivially true in an experimental setting,
but not in a nonexperimental study.8
8The crucial difference between regression adjustment in a setting with experimental data and in a
setting with nonexperimental data comes from the fact that—under a causal interpretation—the average
treatment effect on the treated and the average treatment effect on the controls are necessarily equal—in
expectation—in a randomized experiment, but not in a nonexperimental study. See Freedman (2008a,b),
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3 Monte Carlo
This section illustrates some of the key ideas of this paper using two Monte Carlo studies.
The first study is similar to that in a recent paper by Busso, DiNardo and McCrary (2013),
and it also attempts to mimic some features of the data from the National Supported Work
(NSW) Demonstration (LaLonde, 1986). As in Busso et al. (2013), I focus on the subsample
of African Americans as well as the comparison sample from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), also restricted to African Americans. The outcome of interest is earn-
ings in 1978, and the vector of covariates includes age, years of education, an indicator for
being a high school dropout, marital status, earnings in 1974, earnings in 1975, employ-
ment status in 1974, and employment status in 1975. There are 156 treated units and 624
control units in the final data set. In the first step, I estimate a probit model for treatment,
and calculate a linear prediction from this model (“propensity score”). For each treatment
status, I also estimate a regression model for outcome, and again calculate predicted val-
ues. In the second step, I draw with replacement 780 vectors which consist of: a vector
of covariates, predicted values of both potential outcomes, and the estimated propensity
score. In the third step, I draw iid normal errors, and use them—together with the esti-
mated propensity score—to construct a treatment status for each unit. In the fourth step,
separately for each treatment status, I draw iid normal errors, and use them—together
with predicted values from both regression models—to construct potential outcomes for
each unit. Finally, for each unit, the treatment status is used to determine which potential
outcome is observed.
This procedure is used to draw 10,000 hypothetical samples. For each sample, I esti-
mate the effect of treatment using linear least squares regression—and then calculate the
estimates of the average treatment effect on the treated and the average treatment effect
on the controls which are implied by Theorem 1. I also calculate the implicit weights on
these estimates. Moreover, I estimate the average treatment effect, the average treatment
effect on the treated, and the average treatment effect on the controls using the “flexible
OLS” estimator—which is expected to be unbiased, given the data-generating process de-
scribed above. It might also be useful to note that the true values of these parameters are
equal to –$5,022, $2,229, and –$6,835, respectively.
The main results of this Monte Carlo study are summarized in Figure 1. Each of the
“flexible OLS” estimators is unbiased for its respective parameter. At the same time, how-
ever, linear regression is very biased for each of τATE, τATT, and τATC, with the smallest
Deaton (2010), Schochet (2010), and Lin (2013) for recent discussions of regression adjustments to experi-
mental data.
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Figure 1: Linear Regression and “Flexible OLS” Estimates of Average Treatment Effects
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bias in estimating τATT (for more details, see Table B7 in Appendix B). Note that, on aver-
age, only 20% of the units are treated. Consequently, linear regression is usually closest to
the true effect on the treated, the smaller group, although it is still biased for this parameter.
Given Theorem 1, this result should not seem surprising.
Additional results are presented in Appendix B. In particular, Figure B3 and Table B7
provide evidence of poor finite-sample performance of both components of linear regres-
sion, i.e. the LPM-based estimators of the average treatment effect on the treated and the
average treatment effect on the controls, which are implied by Theorem 1. It is clear that
both of these estimators—unlike the “flexible OLS” estimators in Figure 1—are biased for
their respective parameters, given the data-generating process in this Monte Carlo study.
This is most easily visible in Figure B3. Moreover, Table B8 summarizes the empirical dis-
tribution of the implicit weights which are used by linear regression to reweight both of
these estimates. Even though, on average, 20% of the units are treated, the average weight
on τˆATT is 0.640, with the standard deviation of 0.038 (across 10,000 replications). In other
words, under partial effect heterogeneity linear least squares regression is equivalent to a
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Figure 2: Linear Regression Estimates for Different Values of N0
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weighted average of two estimators, both of which are likely to perform poorly in finite
samples, with weights which are also poorly chosen. It would be difficult to motivate the
use of linear least squares regression under similar circumstances.
The second simulation study is based on the same sample of African Americans, and
it uses a variant of the nonparametric bootstrap. In each replication, I retain the original
sample of 156 treated units. I also draw a subsample of size N0, with replacement, from
the original sample of 624 control units—and append it to the sample of treated units.
Importantly, I consider nine values of N0: 25, 100, 175, 250, 325, 400, 475, 550, and 624.
For each N0, I draw 2,500 hypothetical samples, and then examine the effects of N0 on the
finite-sample performance of linear least squares regression.
The results are summarized in Figure 2.9 An obvious conclusion is that the higher the
proportion of control units, the further we get from the average treatment effect on the
controls—and closer to the average treatment effect on the treated. This relationship is
monotonic, as previously noted in Corollary 2. Additional results from this simulation
9For clarity, Figure 2 excludes 32 estimates (less than 0.15% of their total number) which are smaller
than –12,500. Of course, this exclusion has no effect on the interpretation of this figure.
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study are presented, again, in Appendix B. In particular, Table B9 shows the mean and
median bias, the root-mean-square error (RMSE), the median-absolute error (MAE), and
the standard deviation of linear least squares regression—separately for each N0 and for
the estimation of τATT and τATC. The conclusions are, of course, the same: in terms of bias,
RMSE, and MAE, the performance of linear regression in estimating τATT improves with
the proportion of control units; similarly, when the proportion of treated units increases,
we get closer to τATC. Moreover, Table B10 summarizes the empirical distribution of the
implicit weights which are used by linear least squares regression to reweight the im-
plied estimates of τATT and τATC—again, separately for each N0. When the proportion of
treated units varies between 0.200 and 0.862, the average weight on τˆATT varies between
0.638 and 0.368; it is therefore useful to note that—at least in this particular simulation
study—the average weights on τˆATT and τˆATC vary somewhat less than the proportions
of both groups, but there is also significant variation in weights for each value of N0.
However, as evident in Table B10, the negative relationship between the proportion of
treated (control) units and the implicit weight on τˆATT (τˆATC) is generally very strong.
4 Empirical Applications
This section illustrates the importance of the main theoretical result of this paper by
means of a replication of two applied papers: Berger et al. (2013) on the effects of CIA
interventions during the Cold War on imports from the US; and Martinez-Bravo (2014)
on the effects of appointed officials on village-level electoral results in Indonesia.
The Effects of US Influence on International Trade (Berger et al., 2013)
In a recent paper, Berger et al. (2013) provide evidence that successful CIA interventions
during the Cold War were used to create a larger foreign market for US-produced goods.
The authors use recently declassified CIA documents to construct country- and year-
specific measures of US political influence, and conclude that such influence had a posi-
tive effect on the share of total imports that intervened countries purchased from the US.
At the same time, however, Berger et al. (2013) find no evidence that CIA interventions
increased exports to the US, total imports, or total exports.
In this study, the treatment variable (“CIA intervention” or “US influence”) is binary,
and equals one whenever—in a given country and year—the CIA either installed a new
leader or provided support for the current regime. These activities took various forms,
and included “creation and dissemination of (often false) propaganda, . . . covert politi-
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Table 1: A Replication of Berger et al. (2013)
ln imports
(US)
ln imports
(US)
ln imports
(US)
ln imports
(world)
ln exports
(US)
ln exports
(world)
CIA intervention 0.283** 0.776*** 0.293*** –0.009 0.058 0.000
(0.110) (0.143) (0.109) (0.045) (0.122) (0.052)
Country fixed effects X X X X X
Trade costs and MR controls X X X X X
Observations 4,149 4,149 4,149 4,149 3,922 3,922
Notes: See also Berger et al. (2013) for more details on these data. The unit of observation is a country c in year t,
where c excludes the US and the Soviet Union and t ranges between 1947 and 1989. The dependent variables are
listed in the column headings. Exact definitions of these variables are given in Berger et al. (2013). All regressions
include year fixed effects, a Soviet intervention control, ln per capita income, an indicator for leader turnover, current
leader tenure, and a democracy indicator. Estimation is based on linear least squares regression. Newey–West
standard errors are in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level; **at the 5% level; ***at the 1% level.
cal operations, . . . the destruction of physical infrastructure and capital, as well as covert
paramilitary operations” (Berger et al., 2013). Apart from the treatment variable, the au-
thors also control for year fixed effects, a Soviet intervention control, ln per capita income,
an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, as well as a democracy indicator.
The majority of their baseline specifications also include country fixed effects, trade costs,
and Baier–Bergstrand multilateral resistance (MR) terms. The final sample consists of 166
countries, excludes the US and the Soviet Union, and covers the period from 1947 to 1989.
Among the 166 countries, 51 experienced a CIA intervention during the Cold War. In a
typical year, successful CIA interventions were taking place in 25 countries.
Table 1 reproduces the baseline estimates from Berger et al. (2013). Columns 1–3 report
the estimated effects of CIA interventions on imports from the US. All of the coefficients
are positive and statistically significant. The estimates from columns 1 and 3 are also very
similar in magnitude; the estimate from column 2 is much larger, but this specification
excludes country fixed effects. Therefore, Berger et al. (2013) conclude that CIA interven-
tions increased US imports by almost 30 log points (as in columns 1 and 3), and then their
remaining specifications control for country fixed effects, trade costs, and MR controls.
Further estimates—for different dependent variables—are reported in columns 4–6. All
of these coefficients are insignificant and very close to zero. The authors conclude that
CIA interventions had no impact on exports to the US, total imports, or total exports.
Perhaps surprisingly, however, the authors interpret their main coefficient of interest
as “the average reduced-form impact of CIA interventions on the countries that expe-
rience an intervention” (Berger et al., 2013). Unfortunately, this is not a correct inter-
pretation, given their reliance on a model with homogeneous effects which is estimated
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Table 2: Berger et al. (2013) and Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
ln imports
(US)
ln imports
(US)
ln imports
(US)
ln imports
(world)
ln exports
(US)
ln exports
(world)
CIA intervention 0.283** 0.776*** 0.293*** –0.009 0.058 0.000
(0.110) (0.143) (0.109) (0.045) (0.122) (0.052)
Decomposition (Theorem 1)
a. ATT 0.648*** 0.794*** 0.717*** 0.691*** 0.665*** 0.863***
(0.138) (0.059) (0.142) (0.150) (0.169) (0.145)
b. wATT 0.676 0.832 0.677 0.678 0.689 0.691
c. ATC –0.478*** 0.691*** –0.595*** –1.484*** –1.288*** –1.928***
(0.144) (0.073) (0.145) (0.167) (0.192) (0.183)
d. wATC 0.324 0.168 0.323 0.322 0.311 0.309
OLS = a · b + c · d 0.283** 0.776*** 0.293*** –0.009 0.058 0.000
(0.110) (0.143) (0.109) (0.045) (0.122) (0.052)
Country fixed effects X X X X X
Trade costs and MR controls X X X X X
Observations 4,149 4,149 4,149 4,149 3,922 3,922
P (d = 1) 0.225 0.225 0.225 0.225 0.235 0.235
Notes: See also Berger et al. (2013) for more details on these data. The unit of observation is a country c in year t, where
c excludes the US and the Soviet Union and t ranges between 1947 and 1989. The dependent variables are listed in the
column headings. Exact definitions of these variables are given in Berger et al. (2013). All regressions and propensity
score specifications include year fixed effects, a Soviet intervention control, ln per capita income, an indicator for leader
turnover, current leader tenure, and a democracy indicator. Estimation of “CIA intervention” (=OLS) is based on linear
least squares regression. Estimation of ATT and ATC is described in Section 2 (in particular, see Theorem 1). Newey–West
standard errors (OLS) and Huber–White standard errors (ATT and ATC) are in parentheses. Huber–White standard errors
ignore that the propensity score is estimated.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level; **at the 5% level; ***at the 1% level.
using ordinary least squares. An interpretation is given, however, in Theorem 1 in this
paper: the estimates in Table 1 are all weighted averages of the average effect of CIA in-
terventions on intervened countries (ATT) and the average effect of CIA interventions on
nonintervened countries (ATC), with weights which are perhaps poorly chosen. At the
same time, it is certainly very convincing to follow the intention of the authors, and focus
on the average effect on intervened countries. This parameter can be used to answer the
question about the actual consequences of CIA interventions during the Cold War. It is
less useful to estimate the effect of CIA interventions on countries, in which interventions
were highly unlikely, such as Australia, Canada, or the United Kingdom. Therefore, the
average effect on nonintervened countries is arguably of little interest in this application,
and I focus on the average effect on the “treated”.
Table 2 decomposes the baseline estimates from Berger et al. (2013) into two compo-
nents, the average effect of CIA interventions on intervened countries (ATT) and the av-
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erage effect of CIA interventions on nonintervened countries (ATC). It also reports the
implicit weights on these estimates. First, it is useful to note that about 23% of the units
are treated, but at the same time the weight on τˆATT varies between 0.676 and 0.832. Sec-
ond, the implied estimates of the average effect of CIA interventions on intervened coun-
tries are all positive, statistically significant, and very similar in magnitude. These esti-
mates suggest that CIA interventions influenced all measures of international trade, and
increased US imports, US exports, total imports, and total exports by 65–86 log points.
Therefore, the large discrepancies in the estimates reported in Table 1—and the main
conclusion in Berger et al. (2013)—are driven by the large variation in the effect on non-
intervened countries across specifications. This is easily visible in Table 2, where τˆATC
varies between –1.928 and 0.691, and hence we get the reported variation in the OLS esti-
mate. Whenever τˆATC is negative and relatively large in absolute value (columns 4–6), the
weighted average of τˆATC and τˆATT is approximately zero. Whenever τˆATC is relatively
close to zero (columns 1–3), this weighted average becomes significantly positive.
Still, the following question arises: did CIA interventions really increase international
trade in intervened countries by 65–86 log points? The magnitude of this effect is arguably
difficult to believe, and we need to recall that these estimates are based on an estimator
which is likely to perform very poorly in finite samples (for more details, see Section 3).
More precisely, this method involves two steps: in the first step, calculate the “propensity
score” from the linear probability model; in the second step, calculate average partial
effects from a model which assumes a linear relationship between potential outcomes
and this “propensity score”. This second linearity assumption is particularly restrictive,
and therefore we might need an additional robustness check.
Table 3 reports nearest-neighbor matching estimates of the average effect of CIA in-
terventions on intervened countries. I consider two alternative models for the propensity
score: a linear probability model and a probit model. In the first case, I use the same
model as in the previous procedure, and retain the estimates of the “propensity score”
from Table 2. In other words, I relax a restrictive assumption from the second stage of the
previous two-step procedure, but retain the first stage. As evident in Table 3, the previ-
ous estimates of the average effect of CIA interventions on intervened countries are not
robust to relaxing this assumption. The majority of the estimates become negative and
often statistically significant.
In the second case, I use a probit model for the propensity score, but also implement an
additional refinement of the matching procedure—namely, a requirement of exact match-
ing within each country. As evident in Table 3, again, the estimates are not robust to
this change in the procedure. Columns 1–3 report the estimated effects of CIA interven-
16
Table 3: Matching Estimates of the Effects of US Influence on International Trade
ln imports
(US)
ln imports
(US)
ln imports
(US)
ln imports
(world)
ln exports
(US)
ln exports
(world)
ATT-LPM –0.839 0.823*** –0.905* –0.915* –1.533** –0.817
(0.558) (0.085) (0.527) (0.528) (0.610) (0.529)
Observations 4,149 4,149 4,149 4,149 3,922 3,922
ATT-probit –0.130 –0.212 –0.193 –0.684*** –0.208 –0.572**
(0.207) (0.190) (0.211) (0.241) (0.308) (0.247)
Observations 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,318 1,318
Country fixed effects X X X X X
Trade costs and MR controls X X X X X
Notes: See also Berger et al. (2013) for more details on these data. The unit of observation is a country c in year t,
where c excludes the US and the Soviet Union and t ranges between 1947 and 1989. The dependent variables are
listed in the column headings. Exact definitions of these variables are given in Berger et al. (2013). All propensity
score specifications include year fixed effects, a Soviet intervention control, ln per capita income, an indicator for
leader turnover, current leader tenure, and a democracy indicator. Estimation is based on nearest-neighbor match-
ing on the estimated propensity score (with a single match). For “ATT-probit”, exact matching on c is also required.
The propensity score is estimated using a linear probability model (“ATT-LPM”) or a probit model (“ATT-probit”).
Abadie–Imbens standard errors are in parentheses. These standard errors ignore that the propensity score is esti-
mated.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level; **at the 5% level; ***at the 1% level.
tions on US imports. All of these estimates are insignificant and close to zero. Similarly,
the estimated effect on US exports is also small and statistically insignificant (column 5).
However, the estimated effects on total imports and total exports (columns 4 and 6) are
both negative, statistically significant, and similar in magnitude. These results lead to
an alternative interpretation of these data: CIA interventions might have had a negative
effect on international trade in intervened countries, perhaps by means of destabilizing
their economies and their political institutions. At the same time, the estimated effects
on US imports and US exports are much smaller than on total imports and total exports.
Presumably, successful CIA interventions during the Cold War were indeed used to de-
termine international trade in intervened countries—and counterbalance the negative ef-
fects of these interventions on US trade—but the pattern of these effects is likely to be
very different from the interpretation in Berger et al. (2013).
The Effects of Local Officials on Electoral Results (Martinez-Bravo, 2014)
A recent paper by Martinez-Bravo (2014) examines—both theoretically and empirically—
the differences in behavior between appointed and elected officials. In particular, the au-
thor focuses on the 1999 parliamentary election in Indonesia, i.e. on the first democratic
election in this country after the fall of the Soeharto regime, and compares the electoral
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results in kelurahan and in desa villages (which have appointed and elected heads, respec-
tively). She concludes that Golkar, i.e. Soeharto’s party, was significantly more likely to
win in kelurahan than in desa villages, and hence that “the body of appointed officials . . .
is a key determinant of the extent of electoral fraud and clientelistic spending in new
democracies” (Martinez-Bravo, 2014).
The treatment variable is again binary—and equals one for kelurahan villages. The
sample consists of 43,394 villages, of which 3,036 (7%) are kelurahan and 40,358 (93%) are
desa. The outcome variable is also binary, and equals one if Golkar was the most voted
party in the village; in some cases—though not in the baseline specifications—there is
an alternative outcome variable, which equals one if PDI-P (a competing party and the
winner of the 1999 election) was the most voted party in this village. The majority of
specifications also include district (kabupaten) fixed effects, and many specifications con-
trol for various geographical characteristics of the villages as well as for the availability
of religious, health, and educational facilities.
It is important to note that Martinez-Bravo (2014) does not specify whether her inten-
tion is to estimate the average effect of appointed officials (ATE) or the average effect of
appointed officials on kelurahan villages (ATT). Both of these parameters are potentially
interesting, although the former is presumably more in line with one of the main objec-
tives of Martinez-Bravo (2014), i.e. testing for (average) differences in behavior between
appointed and elected officials. The latter parameter would be more relevant if our in-
tention was to examine the actual impact of appointed officials on the electoral outcome.
Therefore, in this section, I focus on the average treatment effect, but discuss various esti-
mates of both this parameter and the average effect on the “treated”.
Recall, however, that neither of these parameters is recovered by linear least squares
regression, while this is the primary estimation method used by Martinez-Bravo (2014).
The author also uses a probit model and a particular method based on the propensity
score, and all these methods seem to give similar answers. However, quite unexpectedly,
this particular propensity-score method—used by Martinez-Bravo (2014)—is implicitly
based on the assumption of homogeneity in effects; it is in fact equivalent to a variant of
linear least squares regression with a different set of control variables. More precisely, this
method involves three steps: in the first step, the author estimates the propensity score
using an algorithm based on a probit model; in the second step, she imposes the over-
lap condition, calculates quintiles of the distribution of the estimated propensity score,
and uses them to generate five propensity-score strata; in the third step, she runs the re-
gression of the dependent variable on the kelurahan indicator, province fixed effects, five
indicator variables for the strata, and the full set of interactions between the strata and
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Table 4: A Replication of Martinez-Bravo (2014)
Linear probability model Propensity score model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Kelurahan indicator 0.074*** 0.006 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.023*** 0.030*** 0.033***
(0.028) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Geographic controls X X X X X X
Religious controls X X X X
Facilities controls X X
District fixed effects X X X X X X X
Observations 43,394 43,394 43,394 43,394 43,394 21,502 20,565 19,206
Notes: See also Martinez-Bravo (2014) for more details on these data. The unit of observation is a village. The de-
pendent variable equals one if Golkar was the most voted party in the village in the 1999 parliamentary election and
zero otherwise. Geographic controls include population density, a quartic in the logarithm of the village population,
a quartic in the percentage of households whose main occupation is in agriculture, share of agricultural land in the
village, distance to the subdistrict office, distance to the district capital, and indicators for urban and high altitude.
Religious controls include the number of mosques, prayer houses, churches, and Buddhist temples per 1,000 people.
Facilities controls include the number of hospitals, maternity hospitals, polyclinics, puskesmas (primary care centers),
kindergartens, primary schools, high schools, and TVs per 1,000 people. Estimation is based on linear least squares re-
gression, with controls for either the variables listed in the table (columns 1–5) or the propensity-score strata, province
fixed effects, and the full set of interactions between the strata and the fixed effects (columns 6–8). In the latter case, the
variables listed in the table correspond to the propensity score specifications. Cluster-robust standard errors (columns
1–5) and bootstrap standard errors (columns 6–8) are in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level; **at the 5% level; ***at the 1% level.
the fixed effects. Because this last regression does not include interactions between the
control variables and the treatment variable, Martinez-Bravo (2014) implicitly makes the
assumption of treatment effect homogeneity.
Consequently, Table 4 reproduces the baseline estimates from Martinez-Bravo (2014),
both for the linear probability model and for the propensity score model. There are large
differences between the coefficients in column 1 and 2 as well as between column 2 and 3.
However, when geographic controls are included in column 3, the estimated effect stabi-
lizes, and suggests that appointed officials increased the probability of Golkar victory by
6 percentage points (columns 3–5) or 2–3 percentage points (columns 6–8). All of these
coefficients are statistically significant and also very similar in magnitude within each of
the estimation methods.
Table 5 applies the main theoretical result of this paper to these estimates, and decom-
poses all the baseline coefficients from Martinez-Bravo (2014) into two components, the
average effect of appointed officials on kelurahan villages (ATT) and the average effect of
appointed officials on desa villages (ATC). I also report the implicit weights which are
used by linear regression to reweight both of these estimates. While the proportion of
kelurahan villages varies between 7% and 12%, the weight on τˆATT varies between 0.490
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Table 5: Martinez-Bravo (2014) and Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
Linear probability model Propensity score model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Kelurahan indicator 0.074*** 0.006 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.023*** 0.030*** 0.033***
(0.028) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Decomposition (Theorem 1)
a. ATT –0.064* –0.008 –0.008 –0.009 0.037** 0.045*** 0.045***
(0.037) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
b. wATT 0.490 0.671 0.672 0.679 0.785 0.788 0.779
c. ATC 0.074*** 0.192*** 0.191*** 0.192*** –0.026 –0.029 –0.011
(0.027) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032)
d. wATC 0.510 0.329 0.328 0.321 0.215 0.212 0.221
OLS = a · b + c · d 0.074*** 0.006 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.023*** 0.030*** 0.033***
(0.028) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
e. P (d = 1) 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.112 0.114 0.116
f . P (d = 0) 0.930 0.930 0.930 0.930 0.888 0.886 0.884
ATE = e · b + f · d 0.064*** 0.178*** 0.177*** 0.178*** –0.019 –0.020 –0.005
(0.025) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028)
Geographic controls X X X X X X
Religious controls X X X X
Facilities controls X X
District fixed effects X X X X X X X
Observations 43,394 43,394 43,394 43,394 43,394 21,502 20,565 19,206
Notes: See also Martinez-Bravo (2014) for more details on these data. The unit of observation is a village. The dependent
variable equals one if Golkar was the most voted party in the village in the 1999 parliamentary election and zero otherwise.
Geographic controls include population density, a quartic in the logarithm of the village population, a quartic in the percentage
of households whose main occupation is in agriculture, share of agricultural land in the village, distance to the subdistrict office,
distance to the district capital, and indicators for urban and high altitude. Religious controls include the number of mosques,
prayer houses, churches, and Buddhist temples per 1,000 people. Facilities controls include the number of hospitals, maternity
hospitals, polyclinics, puskesmas (primary care centers), kindergartens, primary schools, high schools, and TVs per 1,000 people.
Estimation of “Kelurahan indicator” (=OLS) is based on linear least squares regression, with controls for either the variables
listed in the table (columns 1–5) or the propensity-score strata, province fixed effects, and the full set of interactions between the
strata and the fixed effects (columns 6–8). In the latter case, the variables listed in the table correspond to the propensity score
specifications. Estimation of ATT and ATC is described in Section 2 (in particular, see Theorem 1). Cluster-robust standard
errors (columns 1–5, OLS), bootstrap standard errors (columns 6–8, OLS), and Huber–White standard errors (ATT, ATC, and
ATE) are in parentheses. Huber–White standard errors ignore that the propensity score is estimated.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level; **at the 5% level; ***at the 1% level.
and 0.788. Because—in this empirical context—we should arguably intend to estimate
the average treatment effect, I also report a “properly reweighted” weighted average of
τˆATT and τˆATC, i.e. an estimate of the average effect of appointed officials (ATE). Since the
weights underlying linear regression are poorly chosen, we can expect large differences
between these estimates and the OLS estimates, and this is indeed the case. The results of
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Table 6: Matching Estimates of the Effects of Local Officials on Electoral Results
Linear probability model Probit model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ATT — 0.007 0.070*** 0.087*** 0.069*** 0.028* 0.030* 0.031*
(0.008) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
ATE — 0.003 –0.019 –0.037 –0.003 –0.005 –0.007 –0.001
(0.010) (0.057) (0.056) (0.065) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
Geographic controls X X X X X X
Religious controls X X X X
Facilities controls X X
District fixed effects X X X X X X X
Observations 43,394 43,394 43,394 43,394 43,394 21,502 20,565 19,206
Notes: See also Martinez-Bravo (2014) for more details on these data. The unit of observation is a village. The
dependent variable equals one if Golkar was the most voted party in the village in the 1999 parliamentary election
and zero otherwise. Geographic controls include population density, a quartic in the logarithm of the village pop-
ulation, a quartic in the percentage of households whose main occupation is in agriculture, share of agricultural
land in the village, distance to the subdistrict office, distance to the district capital, and indicators for urban and
high altitude. Religious controls include the number of mosques, prayer houses, churches, and Buddhist temples
per 1,000 people. Facilities controls include the number of hospitals, maternity hospitals, polyclinics, puskesmas
(primary care centers), kindergartens, primary schools, high schools, and TVs per 1,000 people. Estimation is
based on nearest-neighbor matching on the estimated propensity score (with a single match). For columns 6–8,
exact matching on province fixed effects is also required. The propensity score is estimated using a linear probabil-
ity model (columns 1–5) or an algorithm based on a probit model (columns 6–8). A description of this algorithm is
given in Martinez-Bravo (2014). Abadie–Imbens standard errors are in parentheses. These standard errors ignore
that the propensity score is estimated.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level; **at the 5% level; ***at the 1% level.
the decompositions in Table 5 are generally quite surprising, and they differ enormously
between the linear probability model and the propensity score model. In the case of the
linear probability model, all of the implied estimates of the average treatment effect are
positive and statistically significant. The estimates from columns 3–5 are also very sim-
ilar in magnitude, and they suggest that—on average—appointed officials increased the
probability of Golkar victory by 18 percentage points. At the same time, however, the
implied estimates of the average effect on kelurahan villages are close to zero and usually
insignificant. When we turn to the results from the propensity score model, this pattern
is reversed. The average effect of appointed officials on kelurahan villages seems to be rel-
atively small in absolute value, but positive and significant; the average treatment effect
is indistinguishable from zero.
Which of these patterns is believable? Is the average effect of appointed officials
positive, but the average effect on kelurahan villages close to zero? Or, maybe the ap-
pointed officials increased the probability of Golkar victory only in the “treated” villages?
Again, we might try to reconcile these conflicting findings using an alternative estimation
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method. Therefore, Table 6 reports nearest-neighbor matching estimates of the average
effect of appointed officials and of the average effect of appointed officials on kelurahan
villages. The propensity score is estimated either using a linear probability model (as,
implicitly, in Table 5) or using a specific algorithm based on a probit model (as, explicitly,
in Martinez-Bravo, 2014). In the latter case, I also impose a requirement of exact matching
within each province. As evident in Table 6, the pattern of estimated effects now becomes
more coherent. The average effect on the “treated” seems to be positive and statistically
significant; if we ignore column 2, the estimated effects vary between 3 and 9 percentage
points. However, when we turn to the average effect of appointed officials, it is clear that
all of the estimates are insignificant and very close to zero. Perhaps the average differ-
ence in electoral results between similar kelurahan and desa villages is actually negligible,
which casts some doubt on one of the main conclusions in Martinez-Bravo (2014)—that
the behavior of appointed and elected officials is, on average, very different.10
5 Summary
In this paper I study the interpretation of the least squares estimand in the homogeneous
linear model when treatment effects are in fact heterogeneous. This problem is highly
relevant for empirical economists, because many influential papers rely on linear least
squares regression to provide estimates of the effects of various treatments, while it is
clear that treatment effect heterogeneity is empirically important. How should we inter-
pret the estimates in these studies? I derive a new theoretical result which demonstrates
that linear least squares regression is equivalent to a weighted average of two estimators,
both of which are likely to perform poorly in finite samples, with weights which are also
poorly chosen. In particular, the weight which is placed by linear regression on the aver-
10Another conclusion in Martinez-Bravo (2014) is that the effect of appointed officials should be stronger
in districts, in which Golkar was expected to win by a large margin, because such expectations incentivize
these officials to manifest their allegiance to the regime. Also, the effect should be reversed in districts, in
which PDI-P was expected to win by a large margin. These conclusions are tested in Appendix C, where
various models are estimated on subsamples of the original data—and these subsamples are defined on
the basis of district-level electoral results (PDI-P won large, PDI-P just won, Golkar just won, Golkar won
large). Table C11 and Table C12 replicate the estimates from Martinez-Bravo (2014). Table C13 and Table C14
apply the main theoretical result of this paper to these estimates, and decompose all the coefficients from
Table C11 and Table C12 into two components (ATT and ATC). Many of the results change. Table C15 and
Table C16 present nearest-neighbor matching estimates of the average effect of appointed officials and of
the average effect of appointed officials on kelurahan villages, separately for all of the subsamples. If we
prefer the probit-based estimates of the propensity score and exact matching within each province, then
this conclusion in Martinez-Bravo (2014) is correct for the effect of local officials on Golkar victory—this
effect is positive only for districts, in which Golkar won by a large margin, and this includes the average
treatment effect. However, when we turn to the effect on PDI-P victory, neither of the estimated effects is
significantly different from zero—and they are usually very small.
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age effect on each group (treated or controls) is inversely related to the proportion of this
group. The more units get treatment, the less weight is placed on the average treatment
effect on the treated. I also illustrate the importance of this result with two Monte Carlo
studies, as well as with a replication of two prominent applied papers: Berger et al. (2013)
on the effects of CIA interventions on international trade; and Martinez-Bravo (2014) on
the effects of appointed officials on electoral outcomes. In both cases some important
conclusions are not robust to allowing for heterogeneity in effects.
There are several lessons to be learned from this paper. First, empirical economists
often believe that linear least squares regression provides a good approximation to the
average treatment effect. Some authors only give their attention to issues of heterogene-
ity if this is motivated by a theoretical model or previous literature. However, linear
regression might provide biased estimates of each of the relevant parameters of interest
whenever heterogeneity is empirically important. Often, of course, this bias might be
small, but this should never be taken for granted.
Second, it is useful to test for treatment effect heterogeneity. The main result of this
paper (Theorem 1) provides a directly applicable decomposition for every least squares
estimate, which can now be represented as a weighted average of two particular esti-
mates: of the average treatment effect on the treated and of the average treatment effect
on the controls. This decomposition can be applied as an easy-to-use informal test for
treatment effect heterogeneity. However, more sophisticated procedures have also been
developed, and can be used (see, e.g., Crump, Hotz, Imbens and Mitnik, 2008).
Finally, it is essential to always define the parameter of interest. Many empirical pa-
pers lack a clear statement about the actual goal of the researcher—whether they are inter-
ested in the average effect, the average effect on some clearly defined population, or some
other parameter. The linear regression estimand is never the most interesting parameter
per se, and it might not correspond to any of the relevant parameters, as this paper also
clarifies. Defining the parameter is important, because it enables the researcher to provide
an interpretation of their result, and it also guarantees comparability between estimation
methods. In some cases a precise definition of the parameter of interest might even allow
the researcher to continue using linear least squares regression: as this paper clarifies, if
nearly nobody gets treatment and we are interested in the effect on the treated, then we
can maintain that we are approximately correct.
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A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. First, consider L (y | 1, d, X) = α + τd + Xβ (Equation 4). By the
Frisch–Waugh theorem (Frisch and Waugh, 1933), τ = τa, where τa is defined by
L [y | 1, d, p (X)] = αa + τad + γa · p (X) . (12)
Second, notice that (12) is a linear projection of y on two variables: one binary and one
continuous. We can therefore use the following result from Elder et al. (2010):
Lemma 1 (Elder et al., 2010) Let L (y | 1, d, x) = αe + τed + βex denote the linear projection
of y on d (a binary variable) and x (a continuous variable) and let V (·), Cov (·), V (· | ·), and
Cov (· | ·) denote the variance, the covariance, the conditional variance, and the conditional co-
variance, respectively. Then,
τe =
ρ ·V (x | d = 1)
ρ ·V (x | d = 1) + (1− ρ) ·V (x | d = 0) · w1
+
(1− ρ) ·V (x | d = 0)
ρ ·V (x | d = 1) + (1− ρ) ·V (x | d = 0) · w0,
where
w1 =
Cov (d, y)
V (d)
− Cov (d, x)
V (d)
· Cov (x, y | d = 1)
V (x | d = 1)
and
w0 =
Cov (d, y)
V (d)
− Cov (d, x)
V (d)
· Cov (x, y | d = 0)
V (x | d = 0) .
Combining the two pieces gives
τ =
ρ ·V [p (X) | d = 1]
ρ ·V [p (X) | d = 1] + (1− ρ) ·V [p (X) | d = 0] · w
∗
1
+
(1− ρ) ·V [p (X) | d = 0]
ρ ·V [p (X) | d = 1] + (1− ρ) ·V [p (X) | d = 0] · w
∗
0 ,
(13)
where
w∗1 =
Cov (d, y)
V (d)
− Cov [d, p (X)]
V (d)
· Cov [p (X) , y | d = 1]
V [p (X) | d = 1] (14)
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and
w∗0 =
Cov (d, y)
V (d)
− Cov [d, p (X)]
V (d)
· Cov [p (X) , y | d = 0]
V [p (X) | d = 0] . (15)
Third, notice that w∗1 = τAPE|d=0 and w
∗
0 = τAPE|d=1, as defined in (10). Indeed,
Cov (d, y)
V (d)
= E (y | d = 1)− E (y | d = 0) (16)
and also
Cov [d, p (X)]
V (d)
= E [p (X) | d = 1]− E [p (X) | d = 0] . (17)
Moreover, for j = 0, 1,
Cov [p (X) , y | d = j]
V [p (X) | d = j] = γj (18)
where γ1 and γ0 are defined in (7) and (8), respectively. Because
E (y | d = 1)− E (y | d = 0) = (E [p (X) | d = 1]− E [p (X) | d = 0]) · γ1
+ (α1 − α0) + (γ1 − γ0) · E [p (X) | d = 0] (19)
and also
E (y | d = 1)− E (y | d = 0) = (E [p (X) | d = 1]− E [p (X) | d = 0]) · γ0
+ (α1 − α0) + (γ1 − γ0) · E [p (X) | d = 1] , (20)
where again α1 and α0 are defined in (7) and (8), we get the result that w∗1 = τAPE|d=0 and
w∗0 = τAPE|d=1. Interestingly, Equations 19 and 20 are special cases of the Oaxaca–Blinder
decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973; Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo, 2011).
Combining the three pieces gives
τ =
ρ ·V [p (X) | d = 1]
ρ ·V [p (X) | d = 1] + (1− ρ) ·V [p (X) | d = 0] · τAPE|d=0
+
(1− ρ) ·V [p (X) | d = 0]
ρ ·V [p (X) | d = 1] + (1− ρ) ·V [p (X) | d = 0] · τAPE|d=1,
(21)
which completes the proof. 
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B Further Monte Carlo Results
Figure B3: Linear Regression and LPM-Based Estimates of Average Treatment Effects
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Table B7: Simulation Results of the First MC Study
Method Parameter Mean bias Median bias RMSE MAE SD
LR ATE 4812 4810 4952 4810 1170
LR ATT –2439 –2441 2705 2441 1170
LR ATC 6625 6623 6727 6623 1170
Flex. ATE ATE 40 22 2601 1726 2601
Flex. ATT ATT –125 –133 1368 922 1362
Flex. ATC ATC 76 42 3188 2114 3187
Flex. ATT (LPM) ATT 3093 3047 3454 3047 1537
Flex. ATC (LPM) ATC –3193 –3201 3590 3201 1642
Notes: “Method” refers to the estimation method. “Parameter” refers to the parameter of interest, against which biases are
calculated. “LR” denotes linear least squares regression. “Flex. ATE”, “Flex. ATT”, and “Flex. ATC” denote various versions
of the “flexible OLS” estimator. “Flex. ATT (LPM)” and “Flex. ATC (LPM)” denote various versions of the LPM-based
“flexible OLS” estimator. See the text for details.
Table B8: Implicit Weights on τˆATT and τˆATC in the First MC Study
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
P (d = 1) 0.200 0.014 0.146 0.260
P (d = 0) 0.800 0.014 0.740 0.854
wATT 0.640 0.038 0.457 0.767
wATC 0.360 0.038 0.233 0.543
Notes: P (d = 1) denotes the proportion of treated units. P (d = 0) denotes the proportion
of control units. The implicit weights on τˆATT and τˆATC are denoted by wATT and wATC,
respectively.
Table B9: Simulation Results of the Second MC Study
P (d = 1) Mean bias Median bias RMSE MAE SD
Panel A: ATT
0.200 –2304 –2273 2398 2273 662
0.221 –2485 –2457 2577 2457 685
0.247 –2638 –2622 2735 2622 722
0.281 –2881 –2849 2985 2849 781
0.324 –3100 –3030 3225 3030 888
0.384 –3399 –3318 3535 3318 971
0.471 –3761 –3647 3926 3647 1128
0.609 –4380 –4195 4607 4195 1428
0.862 –5962 –5647 6411 5647 2357
Panel B: ATC
0.200 6759 6791 6791 6791 662
0.221 6579 6606 6614 6606 685
0.247 6426 6442 6466 6442 722
0.281 6182 6214 6232 6214 781
0.324 5963 6034 6029 6034 888
0.384 5665 5745 5747 5745 971
0.471 5303 5416 5421 5416 1128
0.609 4683 4869 4896 4869 1428
0.862 3101 3416 3895 3528 2357
Notes: P (d = 1) denotes the proportion of treated units. Simulation results are reported for linear least
squares regression. Biases are calculated against either the average treatment effect on the treated (Panel A)
or the average treatment effect on the controls (Panel B).
Table B10: Implicit Weights on τˆATT and τˆATC in the Second MC Study
wATT wATC
P (d = 1) Mean SD Minimum Maximum Mean SD Minimum Maximum
0.200 0.638 0.032 0.525 0.722 0.362 0.032 0.278 0.475
0.221 0.618 0.035 0.485 0.726 0.382 0.035 0.274 0.515
0.247 0.598 0.036 0.456 0.705 0.402 0.036 0.295 0.544
0.281 0.575 0.039 0.434 0.689 0.425 0.039 0.311 0.566
0.324 0.551 0.041 0.376 0.674 0.449 0.041 0.326 0.624
0.384 0.523 0.042 0.364 0.636 0.477 0.042 0.364 0.636
0.471 0.494 0.045 0.351 0.647 0.506 0.045 0.353 0.649
0.609 0.459 0.048 0.321 0.619 0.541 0.048 0.381 0.679
0.862 0.368 0.072 0.128 0.593 0.632 0.072 0.407 0.872
Notes: P (d = 1) denotes the proportion of treated units. The implicit weights on τˆATT and τˆATC are denoted by wATT and wATC,
respectively.
C Further Results on the Effects of Local Officials
Table C11: A Replication of Martinez-Bravo (2014)—The Effects on Golkar Victory
Whole
sample
PDI-P won
large 1999
PDI-P just
won 1999
Golkar just
won 1999
Golkar won
large 1999
Neither
won
Linear probability model
Kelurahan indicator 0.055*** 0.002 0.076** 0.128*** 0.044** 0.068*
(0.012) (0.016) (0.029) (0.037) (0.018) (0.038)
Observations 43,394 15,430 9,114 5,946 7,378 5,526
Propensity score model
Kelurahan indicator 0.033*** 0.001 0.034*** 0.136*** 0.047*** 0.028
(0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.050) (0.016) (0.025)
Observations 19,206 7,814 4,303 1,822 3,378 1,889
Notes: See also Martinez-Bravo (2014) for more details on these data. The unit of observation is a village. The
dependent variable equals one if Golkar was the most voted party in the village in the 1999 parliamentary election
and zero otherwise. All regressions include geographic controls, religious controls, facilities controls, and district
fixed effects. Estimation is based on linear least squares regression, with controls for either the variables listed in
the table (“Linear probability model”) or the propensity-score strata, province fixed effects, and the full set of in-
teractions between the strata and the fixed effects (“Propensity score model”). In the latter case, the variables listed
in the table correspond to the propensity score specifications. Cluster-robust standard errors (“Linear probability
model”) and bootstrap standard errors (“Propensity score model”) are in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level; **at the 5% level; ***at the 1% level.
Table C12: A Replication of Martinez-Bravo (2014)—The Effects on PDI-P Victory
Whole
sample
PDI-P won
large 1999
PDI-P just
won 1999
Golkar just
won 1999
Golkar won
large 1999
Neither
won
Linear probability model
Kelurahan indicator –0.021 0.037* –0.037 –0.087* –0.024 –0.004
(0.014) (0.021) (0.045) (0.043) (0.015) (0.045)
Observations 43,394 15,430 9,114 5,946 7,378 5,526
Propensity score model
Kelurahan indicator –0.003 0.033*** –0.008 –0.099*** –0.021* –0.023
(0.010) (0.009) (0.039) (0.036) (0.011) (0.045)
Observations 19,206 7,814 4,303 1,822 3,378 1,889
Notes: See also Martinez-Bravo (2014) for more details on these data. The unit of observation is a village. The
dependent variable equals one if PDI-P was the most voted party in the village in the 1999 parliamentary election
and zero otherwise. All regressions include geographic controls, religious controls, facilities controls, and district
fixed effects. Estimation is based on linear least squares regression, with controls for either the variables listed in
the table (“Linear probability model”) or the propensity-score strata, province fixed effects, and the full set of in-
teractions between the strata and the fixed effects (“Propensity score model”). In the latter case, the variables listed
in the table correspond to the propensity score specifications. Cluster-robust standard errors (“Linear probability
model”) and bootstrap standard errors (“Propensity score model”) are in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level; **at the 5% level; ***at the 1% level.
Table C13: Martinez-Bravo (2014) and Treatment Effect Heterogeneity—The Effects on Golkar Victory
Whole
sample
PDI-P won
large 1999
PDI-P just
won 1999
Golkar just
won 1999
Golkar won
large 1999 Neither won
Linear probability model
Kelurahan indicator 0.055*** 0.002 0.076** 0.128*** 0.044** 0.068*
(0.012) (0.016) (0.029) (0.037) (0.018) (0.038)
Decomposition (Theorem 1)
a. ATT –0.009 0.016 0.107*** 0.094** 0.012 0.093*
(0.028) (0.032) (0.039) (0.047) (0.027) (0.051)
b. wATT 0.679 0.614 0.715 0.586 0.603 0.771
c. ATC 0.192*** –0.022 –0.001 0.175*** 0.093*** –0.017
(0.042) (0.017) (0.065) (0.063) (0.025) (0.054)
d. wATC 0.321 0.386 0.285 0.414 0.397 0.229
OLS = a · b + c · d 0.055*** 0.002 0.076** 0.128*** 0.044** 0.068*
(0.012) (0.016) (0.029) (0.037) (0.018) (0.038)
e. P (d = 1) 0.070 0.070 0.060 0.060 0.110 0.045
f . P (d = 0) 0.930 0.930 0.940 0.940 0.890 0.955
ATE = e · b + f · d 0.178*** –0.019 0.006 0.170*** 0.084*** –0.012
(0.038) (0.016) (0.061) (0.060) (0.022) (0.052)
Observations 43,394 15,430 9,114 5,946 7,378 5,526
Propensity score model
Kelurahan indicator 0.033*** 0.001 0.034*** 0.136*** 0.047*** 0.028
(0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.050) (0.016) (0.025)
Decomposition (Theorem 1)
a. ATT 0.045*** 0.004 0.064* 0.100 0.048** 0.034
(0.016) (0.011) (0.034) (0.061) (0.022) (0.028)
b. wATT 0.779 0.852 0.782 0.705 0.660 0.879
c. ATC –0.011 –0.011 –0.073 0.224*** 0.045* –0.019
(0.032) (0.019) (0.063) (0.071) (0.023) (0.032)
d. wATC 0.221 0.148 0.218 0.295 0.340 0.121
OLS = a · b + c · d 0.033*** 0.001 0.034*** 0.136*** 0.047*** 0.028
(0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.050) (0.016) (0.025)
e. P (d = 1) 0.116 0.099 0.104 0.110 0.181 0.100
f . P (d = 0) 0.884 0.901 0.896 0.890 0.819 0.900
ATE = e · b + f · d –0.005 –0.009 –0.059 0.210*** 0.046** –0.013
(0.028) (0.017) (0.058) (0.067) (0.021) (0.029)
Observations 19,206 7,814 4,303 1,822 3,378 1,889
Notes: See also Martinez-Bravo (2014) for more details on these data. The unit of observation is a village. The dependent variable
equals one if Golkar was the most voted party in the village in the 1999 parliamentary election and zero otherwise. All regressions
and propensity score specifications include geographic controls, religious controls, facilities controls, and district fixed effects.
Estimation of “Kelurahan indicator” (=OLS) is based on linear least squares regression, with controls for either the variables listed in
the table (“Linear probability model”) or the propensity-score strata, province fixed effects, and the full set of interactions between
the strata and the fixed effects (“Propensity score model”). In the latter case, the variables listed in the table correspond to the
propensity score specifications. Estimation of ATT and ATC is described in Section 2 (in particular, see Theorem 1). Cluster-robust
standard errors (“Linear probability model”, OLS), bootstrap standard errors (“Propensity score model”, OLS), and Huber–White
standard errors (ATT, ATC, and ATE) are in parentheses. Huber–White standard errors ignore that the propensity score is estimated.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level; **at the 5% level; ***at the 1% level.
Table C14: Martinez-Bravo (2014) and Treatment Effect Heterogeneity—The Effects on PDI-P Victory
Whole
sample
PDI-P won
large 1999
PDI-P just
won 1999
Golkar just
won 1999
Golkar won
large 1999 Neither won
Linear probability model
Kelurahan indicator –0.021 0.037* –0.037 –0.087* –0.024 –0.004
(0.014) (0.021) (0.045) (0.043) (0.015) (0.045)
Decomposition (Theorem 1)
a. ATT 0.012 0.006 –0.069 –0.110 0.011 –0.024
(0.025) (0.040) (0.059) (0.074) (0.024) (0.051)
b. wATT 0.679 0.614 0.715 0.586 0.603 0.771
c. ATC –0.091** 0.086*** 0.043 –0.055 –0.078*** 0.065
(0.041) (0.025) (0.062) (0.047) (0.021) (0.057)
d. wATC 0.321 0.386 0.285 0.414 0.397 0.229
OLS = a · b + c · d –0.021 0.037* –0.037 –0.087* –0.024 –0.004
(0.014) (0.021) (0.045) (0.043) (0.015) (0.045)
e. P (d = 1) 0.070 0.070 0.060 0.060 0.110 0.045
f . P (d = 0) 0.930 0.930 0.940 0.940 0.890 0.955
ATE = e · b + f · d –0.084** 0.080*** 0.036 –0.058 –0.068*** 0.061
(0.037) (0.023) (0.059) (0.046) (0.019) (0.056)
Observations 43,394 15,430 9,114 5,946 7,378 5,526
Propensity score model
Kelurahan indicator –0.003 0.033*** –0.008 –0.099*** –0.021* –0.023
(0.010) (0.009) (0.039) (0.036) (0.011) (0.045)
Decomposition (Theorem 1)
a. ATT –0.025 0.029 –0.030 –0.098 –0.021 –0.030
(0.020) (0.021) (0.047) (0.061) (0.016) (0.055)
b. wATT 0.779 0.852 0.782 0.705 0.660 0.879
c. ATC 0.073** 0.054* 0.070 –0.102 –0.020 0.032
(0.032) (0.031) (0.066) (0.076) (0.021) (0.064)
d. wATC 0.221 0.148 0.218 0.295 0.340 0.121
OLS = a · b + c · d –0.003 0.033*** –0.008 –0.099*** –0.021* –0.023
(0.010) (0.009) (0.039) (0.036) (0.011) (0.045)
e. P (d = 1) 0.116 0.099 0.104 0.110 0.181 0.100
f . P (d = 0) 0.884 0.901 0.896 0.890 0.819 0.900
ATE = e · b + f · d 0.062** 0.052* 0.059 –0.102 –0.020 0.026
(0.029) (0.028) (0.062) (0.073) (0.019) (0.060)
Observations 19,206 7,814 4,303 1,822 3,378 1,889
Notes: See also Martinez-Bravo (2014) for more details on these data. The unit of observation is a village. The dependent variable
equals one if PDI-P was the most voted party in the village in the 1999 parliamentary election and zero otherwise. All regressions
and propensity score specifications include geographic controls, religious controls, facilities controls, and district fixed effects.
Estimation of “Kelurahan indicator” (=OLS) is based on linear least squares regression, with controls for either the variables listed in
the table (“Linear probability model”) or the propensity-score strata, province fixed effects, and the full set of interactions between
the strata and the fixed effects (“Propensity score model”). In the latter case, the variables listed in the table correspond to the
propensity score specifications. Estimation of ATT and ATC is described in Section 2 (in particular, see Theorem 1). Cluster-robust
standard errors (“Linear probability model”, OLS), bootstrap standard errors (“Propensity score model”, OLS), and Huber–White
standard errors (ATT, ATC, and ATE) are in parentheses. Huber–White standard errors ignore that the propensity score is estimated.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level; **at the 5% level; ***at the 1% level.
Table C15: Matching Estimates of the Effects of Local Officials on Golkar Victory
Whole
sample
PDI-P won
large 1999
PDI-P just
won 1999
Golkar just
won 1999
Golkar won
large 1999
Neither
won
ATT-LPM 0.069*** –0.021 0.087** –0.031 0.115*** 0.032
(0.026) (0.041) (0.039) (0.129) (0.036) (0.041)
ATE-LPM –0.003 –0.062 0.307* –0.151 0.116 0.570**
(0.065) (0.049) (0.163) (0.207) (0.081) (0.266)
Observations 43,394 15,430 9,114 5,946 7,378 5,526
ATT-probit 0.031* –0.006 0.000 0.104 0.044* 0.016
(0.016) (0.022) (0.042) (0.081) (0.026) (0.049)
ATE-probit –0.001 –0.008 0.037 0.131 0.070** –0.037
(0.031) (0.044) (0.076) (0.142) (0.032) (0.069)
Observations 19,206 7,814 4,303 1,822 3,378 1,889
Notes: See also Martinez-Bravo (2014) for more details on these data. The unit of observation is a village.
The dependent variable equals one if Golkar was the most voted party in the village in the 1999 parliamen-
tary election and zero otherwise. All propensity score specifications include geographic controls, religious
controls, facilities controls, and district fixed effects. Estimation is based on nearest-neighbor matching on
the estimated propensity score (with a single match). For “ATT-probit” and “ATE-probit”, exact matching
on province fixed effects is also required. The propensity score is estimated using a linear probability model
(“ATT-LPM” and “ATE-LPM”) or an algorithm based on a probit model (“ATT-probit” and “ATE-probit”).
A description of this algorithm is given in Martinez-Bravo (2014). Abadie–Imbens standard errors are in
parentheses. These standard errors ignore that the propensity score is estimated.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level; **at the 5% level; ***at the 1% level.
Table C16: Matching Estimates of the Effects of Local Officials on PDI-P Victory
Whole
sample
PDI-P won
large 1999
PDI-P just
won 1999
Golkar just
won 1999
Golkar won
large 1999
Neither
won
ATT-LPM –0.015 0.047 –0.060 0.059 –0.075** –0.004
(0.027) (0.051) (0.049) (0.119) (0.030) (0.058)
ATE-LPM 0.120* 0.118* –0.142 –0.145 –0.074 –0.117
(0.070) (0.063) (0.176) (0.156) (0.070) (0.217)
Observations 43,394 15,430 9,114 5,946 7,378 5,526
ATT-probit –0.008 0.043 –0.034 –0.055 –0.015 –0.037
(0.020) (0.030) (0.053) (0.078) (0.020) (0.092)
ATE-probit 0.014 0.037 0.122 –0.087 –0.033 –0.107
(0.041) (0.058) (0.099) (0.123) (0.026) (0.122)
Observations 19,206 7,814 4,303 1,822 3,378 1,889
Notes: See also Martinez-Bravo (2014) for more details on these data. The unit of observation is a village.
The dependent variable equals one if PDI-P was the most voted party in the village in the 1999 parliamen-
tary election and zero otherwise. All propensity score specifications include geographic controls, religious
controls, facilities controls, and district fixed effects. Estimation is based on nearest-neighbor matching on
the estimated propensity score (with a single match). For “ATT-probit” and “ATE-probit”, exact matching
on province fixed effects is also required. The propensity score is estimated using a linear probability model
(“ATT-LPM” and “ATE-LPM”) or an algorithm based on a probit model (“ATT-probit” and “ATE-probit”).
A description of this algorithm is given in Martinez-Bravo (2014). Abadie–Imbens standard errors are in
parentheses. These standard errors ignore that the propensity score is estimated.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level; **at the 5% level; ***at the 1% level.
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